Bayesian Persuasion with Externalities: Exploiting Agent Types

Jonathan Shaki, Jiarui Gan, Sarit Kraus·December 17, 2024

Summary

The paper explores Bayesian persuasion with externalities, focusing on a model where a principal informs multiple agents about the world state through signals, affecting their utilities. Agents are categorized into types with identical utility functions, enabling the principal to correlate their actions as a correlation device. The study examines optimal signaling strategies under public, private, and semi-private channels, offering LP formulations and analyzing problem tractability. It demonstrates polynomial-time computation for bounded deviating agents and NP-hardness otherwise. The work addresses the computational challenge of coordinating agents' actions in the presence of externalities, a generalization of the no-externalities case.

Key findings

2

Introduction
Background
Overview of Bayesian persuasion theory
Importance of externalities in signaling models
Objective
To explore optimal signaling strategies in a Bayesian persuasion model with externalities, focusing on the coordination of agents' actions through signals.
Model and Framework
Model Description
Agents' categorization into types with identical utility functions
Principal's role in informing agents about the world state through signals
Agents' actions as a correlation device influenced by signals
Externalities in the Model
Explanation of how externalities affect agents' utilities and actions
Differentiating between public, private, and semi-private channels of communication
Optimal Signaling Strategies
Public Channel
LP formulation for optimal signaling
Analysis of tractability and computational complexity
Private Channel
LP formulation for optimal signaling
Analysis of tractability and computational complexity
Semi-Private Channel
LP formulation for optimal signaling
Analysis of tractability and computational complexity
Computational Complexity
Bounded Deviating Agents
Polynomial-time computation for optimal signaling strategies
Unbounded Deviating Agents
NP-hardness of computing optimal signaling strategies
Generalization and Challenges
Generalization of No-Externalities Case
Comparison with traditional Bayesian persuasion models
Discussion on the added complexity of externalities
Computational Challenge
Addressing the challenge of coordinating agents' actions in the presence of externalities
Strategies for tractable computation
Conclusion
Summary of Findings
Key insights into optimal signaling strategies under different communication channels
Implications for the coordination of actions in Bayesian persuasion models with externalities
Future Research Directions
Potential areas for further exploration in Bayesian persuasion with externalities
Basic info
papers
computer science and game theory
artificial intelligence
Advanced features
Insights
How does the paper categorize the agents in the model?
What are the different types of communication channels explored in the study?
What computational challenges does the paper address in coordinating agents' actions in the presence of externalities?